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Essays on Microeconomic Theory
Xingye Wu
This dissertation analyzes problems related tomatching in general networks and decision
under uncertainty. Chapter 1 introduces the framework of convex matching games. Chapter
2 discusses three distinct applications of the framework. Chapter 3 develops a new test of
choice models with expected utility.
InChapter 1, I use Scarf’s lemma to show that given a convexity structure that I introduce,
the core of a matching game is always nonempty. This framework can accommodate general
contracting networks, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences.
In Chapter 2, I provide three applications to show how the convexity structure is satisfied
in different contexts by different assumptions. In the first application, I show that in large
economies, the convexity structure is satisfied if the set of participants in each contract is
small compared to the overall economy. The second application considers finite economies,
and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied if all agents have convex, but not neces-
sarily substitutable, preferences. The third application considers a large-firm, many-to-one
matching market with peer preferences, and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied
under convexity of preferences and a competition aversion restriction on workers’ preferences
over colleagues.
In Chapter 3, I show that some form of cyclic choice pattern across distinct informa-
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Chapter 1. Theory of Convex Matching Games: A Scarf’s Lemma Approach
1.1 Introduction
Although matching theory has been successfully applied to markets with indivisible
goods, personalized contract terms, and non-transferable or imperfectly transferable payoffs,
the literature has primarily focused on two-sided markets with bilateral contracts and sub-
stitutable preferences1. These restrictions significantly limit the scope of existing matching
models because they are often not satisfied in reality. For example, in a labor market with
firms and workers, substitutable preferences are not satisfied if firms demand workers with
complementary skills or dual-career couples demand two jobs in the same region. Moreover,
the two-sided structure of the market is violated if firms can create joint ventures or workers
can build economic or social relationships, such as marriage or labor unions. In these cases,
relationships occur between firms and workers, as well as among firms and among workers.
Furthermore, multilateral relationships or contracts naturally emerge when we consider joint
ventures or projects that demand a rich set of resources or skills and thus involve more than
two parties. Going one step further, as workers usually value not only the firm for which they
work but also the colleagues with whom they work, we may interpret the nature of a firm as a
multilateral economic relationship among all workers in the firm. Under this interpretation,
a probably more appropriate approach is to model the labor market as a coalition formation
game2 instead of a two-sided market. In a coalition formation game, firms are no longer
exogenous institutions but can be endogenously restructured, liquidated, or created by their
workers. Furthermore, because individuals in reality may be simultaneously involved in
1See, for example, Kelso and Crawford (1982), Roth (1984), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).
2See, for example, Banerjee, Konishi, and Tayfun (2001), Cechlarova and Romero-Medina (2001), and
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
1
multiple economic and social relationships, we also need to go beyond the narrowly defined
coalition formation games in the literature, in which each agent can join at most one coalition.
Clearly, a labor market with all the complications discussed above is far beyond the scope
of standard matching models that are restricted to two-sided markets with bilateral contracts
and substitutable preferences.
The major difficulty that arises when relaxing these restrictions is the empty core prob-
lem. With arbitrary contracting networks, multilateral contracts, or complementary prefer-
ences, it is well known that the core of a matching model is often empty—that is, there is
no allocation immune to profitable joint deviations by groups of agents. For example, Gale
and Shapley (1962) highlight the possibility of an empty core in a one-sided market using
their unstable roommate example. In Kelso and Crawford (1982), substitutable preferences
are shown to be indispensable for the nonemptiness of the core in a two-sided, many-to-one
matching model. Moreover, Alkan (1988) shows that the core may be empty with multi-
lateral contracts, even if all agents have additively separable preferences. When the core is
empty, every allocation is considered unstable in the sense that there is always a group of
agents who can benefit from ignoring the prescribed allocation and instead taking some joint
action by themselves. Therefore, the possibility of having an empty core is a fundamental
problem when we apply a matching model to either a decentralized or centralized market.
In a decentralized market, the empty core problem renders our model useless because it has
no predictive power. On the other hand, when we explore the possibility of centralizing a
market from a mechanism design perspective, the empty core problem is a substantial threat
to whatever mechanism we might devise, as there is always a group of agents who can benefit
from bypassing the mechanism and instead acting according to some agreement reached by
themselves. Therefore, if we can resolve the empty core problem faced when considering
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arbitrary contracting networks, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences, the
scope and applicability of matching models will be greatly expanded to markets with more
complicated economic and social relationships.
The first two chapters of my thesis is motivated by the discussions above. I explore the
possibility of obtaining nonempty core results in models that allow for general contracting
network structures, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences. Moreover, I
also want to maintain, if possible, the strengths of existing matching models, including the
flexibility to cope with indivisible goods, personalized contract terms, and non-transferable
or imperfectly transferable payoffs.
In this chapter, I show that the core is nonempty in all matching games with a convexity
condition that I will introduce, including a large class of models that allow for arbitrary
contracting networks, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences. In a rough
sense, the convexity of a matching game requires that the allocation space is convex and that
for each potential block, the set of unblocked allocations is also convex. Chapter 2 provides
three applications, and we will see that the convexity of matching games is not directly
related to convex preferences. The matching game may be convex without an assumption of
convex preferences, while in other cases convex preferences are not sufficient to guarantee
the convexity of the matching game. Furthermore, my notion of convex matching games
is not related to the notion of convex cooperative games in Shapley (1971), which requires
the characteristic function to be supermodular. The notion of convex matching games that
I will introduce can handle models in which the characteristic function fails to exhibit
supermodularity.
Scarf’s lemma is central to my approach to the nonemptiness of the core, in contrast
to the standard fixed-point approach in matching theory (see, for example, Adachi 2000,
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Fleiner 2003, Echenique and Oviedo 2004, 2006, and Hatfield and Milgrom 2005). Scarf’s
lemma first appeared in the seminal paper Scarf (1967), where it is used to show that a
balanced non-transferable utility (NTU) game always has a nonempty core. The lemma has
received attention from the combinatorics literature since Aharoni and Holzman (1998). In
particular, Aharoni and Fleiner (2003) use Scarf’s lemma to prove a fractional version of
stable matchings for hypergraphs, which suggests a potential extension of Gale and Shapley
(1962) to general contracting networks if fractionalmatchings in their paper can be interpreted
appropriately as actual matchings. Relating to their paper, the convex matching games I will
introduce can be viewed as a systematic framework for interpreting fractional allocations,
and the applications in this paper provide concrete ways in which the interpretation may work
in different contexts. In Chapter 2, my first and third applications will provide a natural
interpretation of fractional allocations in continuum economies, and my second application
will provide an interpretation when contract terms are taken from a convex set. Nguyen and
Vohra (2017) study a finite two-sided labor market with couples and use Scarf’s lemma to
find a stable fractional matching that may not be interpreted as an actual matching. The next
step in their paper is to use a rounding algorithm to find a nearby integer matching that is
near-feasible and stable. By contrast, in the convex matching game defined in my paper, the
stable fractional allocation found by Scarf’s lemma can be directly interpreted as an actual
allocation that is in the core, and therefore, a second step such as that in Nguyen and Vohra
(2017) is unnecessary.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 1.3 introduces the framework of convex matching games and states the
nonempty core result. Section 1.4 uses Scarf’s lemma to prove the nonemptiness of the core
in convex matching games, and Section 1.5 concludes.
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1.2 Literature
In the matching literature, a number of papers have attempted to obtain existence results
for core-like solution concepts while relaxing some of the standard restrictions, but they
lack the level of generality offered in this paper. For example, some papers have been
devoted to labor market matchings with complementary preferences, especially those that
emerge because of the presence of dual-career couples. These works show that stable
matchings exist only under very restrictive assumptions on preferences in finite markets
(see, for example, Cantala 2004 and Klaus and Klijn 2005). In large markets, however, the
problem of complementary preferences tends to vanish, as noted in a sequence of recent
papers, including Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2013), Ashlagi, Braverman, and Hassidim
(2014), Azevedo and Hatfield (2015), and Che, Kim, and Kojima (2017). However, all of
these results, except for Azevedo and Hatfield (2015), only apply to two-sided markets with
bilateral contracts, which is a restriction I wish to relax in this paper.
Some papers attempt to go beyond two-sided markets, and they typically find that some
restrictions on preferences or on the network structure have to be imposed to allow the ex-
istence of the core or stable allocations. For example, in an NTU finite-market framework,
Ostrovsky (2008) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012) show that stable matchings exist in a
vertical supply chain network if preferences are fully substitutable. In a TU finite-market
framework, Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky, and Westkamp (2013) show that com-
petitive equilibria and core allocations exist in an arbitrary trading network given substitutable
preferences. In a TU continuum-economy framework, Azevedo, Weyl, andWhite (2013) and
Azevedo and Hatfield (2015) (in their Section 6) show that when substitutable preferences are
relaxed, competitive equilibria and core allocations still exist. However, my general frame-
work of convex matching games assumes neither TU, nor substitutability of preferences, nor
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a vertical supply chain network. Furthermore, all results mentioned in this paragraph only
apply to bilateral contracts, but my framework allows for multilateral contracts.
Some papers in the literature consider multilateral contracts and find that a nonempty
core can only be obtained under relatively restrictive assumptions on preferences or on
the contracting network. For example, Dutta and Masso (1997) and Bodine-Baron, Lee,
Chong, Hassibi, and Wierman (2011) study multilateral contracts that emerge as a result
of preferences over peers in many-to-one matching problems. More generally, Banerjee,
Konishi, and Tayfun (2001), Cechlarova and Romero-Medina (2001), Bogomolnaia and
Jackson (2002), Papai (2004), and Pycia (2012) consider coalition formation games, in which
agents endogenously form disjoint coalitions. In this framework, each coalition can be viewed
as a multilateral contract, but each agent only demands at most one contract. However, my
framework of convex matching games is more general in the sense that each agent may be
simultaneously involved in multiple contracts, as is in the first two applications in Chapter
2. Furthermore, in the first application, no assumption on preferences beyond continuity is
needed for the nonempty core result, as opposed to the restrictive assumptions made in the
literature.
1.3 Framework: Convex Matching Games
In this section, I introduce the concept of “convex matching games” and state the central
result of this paper, i.e., a regular convex matching game always has a nonempty core. The
framework of convex matching games is applicable to a large class of models that allow for
arbitrary contracting networks, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences, as we
will see in Chapter 2. Because of its generality, this framework has to be introduced with
some level of abstractness. The exact meaning of each component of this framework will
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depend on its context. In Chapter 2, when we come to applications, the meaning of those
abstract objects will become clear.
Consider a matching game G := {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I}. The set I is a finite set of players.
In applications, a player i ∈ I may represent either one agent or a continuum of identical
agents, i.e., a type of agents. The setM is the set of allocations. For each allocation µ ∈ M,
the vector φ (µ) ∈ [0, 1]I is the characteristic vector of allocation µ. In applications in which
i ∈ I represents one agent, the characteristic value φi (µ) is either 0 or 1, indicating whether
agent i is “involved” in allocation µ. In applications in which i ∈ I represents a continuum
of identical players, the value φi (µ) ∈ [0, 1] represents the fraction of type-i agents involved
in allocation µ. Let the set
Mi := {µ ∈ M : φi (µ) > 0}
be the set of allocations that involve player i. Each player i is associated with a domination
relation Ai fromMi toM. When µˆ Ai µ, we say that µˆ ∈ Mi dominates allocation µ ∈ M
at player i. In the set M of allocations, let us assume that there exists a unique “empty”
allocation µ0 that involves no player, i.e., its characteristic vector φ (µ) = 0. In applications,
µ0 is the allocation under which agents do not interact with one another.
In applications, the domination relations (Ai)i∈I are typically derived from agents’
preferences. When i represents one agent, µˆ Ai µ means that agent i strictly prefers µˆ to µ.
When i represents a type of agents, I am particularly interested in the domination relation Ai
such that µˆ Ai µ if and only if there are some type-i agents under allocation µwho are willing
to switch to even the worst position in allocation µˆ. If all players involved in allocation µˆ are
willing to switch to µˆ from µ, then allocation µ is unstable in the sense that it is vulnerable to
the profitable joint deviation µˆ. When this is the case, we say that the allocation µ is blocked
by µˆ. This motivates the following definition.
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Definition 1.1 In a matching game G = {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I}, an allocation µ ∈ M is blocked
by a nonempty allocation µˆ, if µˆ Ai µ for each i ∈ I with φi (µˆ) > 0. An allocation µ is in
the core if it is not blocked by any nonempty allocation.
The goal of this chapter is to obtain nonemptiness of the core, and I find the following
convexity structure to be particularly relevant to that end.
Definition 1.2 A matching game G = {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I} is convex if it satisfies the following
three requirements:
(1) The allocation spaceM is a subset of a vector space over the field R, with the empty
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statement (2) in the definition essentially requires that for each i the allocation space M
is closed under the operation of taking a φi-convex combination. Statement (3) requires
that µˆ does not dominate a φi-convex combination of a set of Di-better allocations at player
i. In applications, the relation Di can be roughly interpreted as the preference relation of
player i. When i represents a continuum of identical players, the relation Di is obtained by
comparing the worst position for type-i agents under two allocations, as we will see in the
large-economy application in the first application in the next chapter. Intuitively speaking,
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statement (3) requires that if player i weakly prefers a set of allocations to a potential block,
then player i is unwilling to participate in the block under any φi-convex combination of these
allocations.
In addition to the convexity structure, let us also endow matching games with the
following topological structure.
Definition 1.3 A matching game G = {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I} is regular if the following hold:
(1) The allocation spaceM is a compact topological space.
(2) For each i ∈ I, the set {µ ∈ M : µˆ bi µ} of allocations unblocked by µˆ is closed for
each µˆ ∈ Mi.
The regularity condition defined above is relatively mild. Intuitively,3 statement (2) re-
quires that a sequence of undominated allocations cannot converge to a dominated allocation.
In applications, this is typically satisfied by assuming continuous preferences.
Now let us state the central theorem of this chapter.
Theorem 1.4 In a regular and convex matching game G, the core is always nonempty.
The discussion for now has been entirely abstract, and we cannot learn much from this
nonempty core result unless we endow the abstract framework with concrete meanings. In
Chapter 2, I will study three concrete applications, but before doing that let’s first deal with
the proof of Theorem 1.4.
3This intuition is convenient but not entirely precise, because closedness is different from sequential
closedness in general topological spaces. In this paper, however, all three applications have a metrizable space
of allocations, and thus, closeness and sequential closedness are equivalent.
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1.4 Scarf’s Lemma Approach to Core
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1.4 using Scarf’s lemma, which first
appeared in the seminal paper Scarf (1967). Consider an n-by-m non-negative matrix A =(
ai, j
)
, each of whose columns has at least one positive entry. Each row i of A is associated
with a complete and transitive relation Di over those column js with ai, j > 0. It is said that
a vector w in the polyhedron
{
w ∈ Rm+ : Aw ≤ 1
}
dominates column j at row i if ai, j > 0,∑m
k=1 w
kai,k = 1, and k Di j for all k with wk > 0 and ai,k > 0. In words, a vector w
dominates column j at row i if the inequality Aw ≤ 1 is binding at row i, j is in the domain
ofDi, andDi-dominated by every column k in the support of w, provided that k is also in the
domain of Di. We also say that a vector w dominates column j, without specifying at which
row, if it does so at some row.
Lemma 1.5 (Scarf, 1967) There exists a vector in the polyhedron
{
w ∈ Rm+ : Aw ≤ 1
}
that
dominates every column of A.4
To see how Scarf’s lemma is related to the core of a convex matching game, consider





allocations induces a matrix A, whose rows are indexed by I and columns are indexed by
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. The j-th column of A is the characteristic vector φ (µ j ) of the j-th allocation




, 0. Let Di associated with row
i be the relation guaranteed to exist by Definition 1.2(3). Then, the following observation is
straightforward.




j=1 of nonempty allocations
4This formulation can be found, for example, in Kiraly and Pap (2008). In the combinatorial literature, the
relation ≥i is often assumed to be a total order. However, in fact, we can relax anti-symmetry to allow ties.
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in a convex matching game, if a vector w ∈ Rm+ with Aw ≤ 1 dominates column j at row i,
then the w-linear combination µ :=
∑m
j=1 w
j µ j is also an allocation inM, and furthermore,
µ j bi µ.














= 1 and µk Di µ j for all k with wk > 0 and µ j ∈ Mi.
Scarf’s lemma claims that there exists a vector w∗ ∈ Rm+ with Aw∗ ≤ 1 that dominates
every column of A. Then, the w∗-linear combination µ∗ :=
∑m
j=1 w
∗ j µ j is an allocation that
is not blocked by any µ j , as µ j bi µ∗ by the Proposition above. Then, we have the following
corollary.




j=1 of nonempty allocations in a convex matching
game G = {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I}, there exists allocation µ∗ ∈ M that is not blocked by each µ j
in this finite family.
From the corollary above, we know that we can find an allocation µ∗ that is not blocked
by finitely many allocations. However, to obtain an allocation in the core, in general, we have
to rule out infinitely many potential blocks. This gap between finitely and infinitely many
potential blocks is filled by the regularity condition.
LetM∗ ⊂ M be the core of a regular and convex matching game G. By definition, it







⊂ M represents the set of allocations that cannot be blocked by µˆ. It is well known
that in a compact topological space, a family of closed sets has a nonempty intersection if
11
every finite sub-family has a nonempty intersection. By the regularity of the matching game
G, the allocation spaceM is compact. EachM∗
µˆ
is closed inM because it can be represented




{µ ∈ M : µˆ bi µ}
and each component of the union is closed by regularity of the matching game. Finally,
Corollary 1.7 implies that the intersection of every finite family of M∗
µˆ
s is nonempty, and
therefore, the coreM∗, as the intersection of allM∗
µˆ
s, is also nonempty. This completes the
proof of the central result of this chapter, Theorem 1.4.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I show that the core is nonempty in all matching games that satisfy a
convexity structure. Roughly speaking, the convexity of a matching game requires that the
allocation space is a convex set and that a player is unwilling to participate in a potential
block under a convex combination of allocations that are weakly more preferred to the block.
Scarf’s lemma is central to my approach to the nonemptiness of the core, in contrast to the
standard fixed-point approach in matching theory.
The next chapter will be devoted to three applications of the abstract framework, where
we will see how it can be applied to various matching models with general contracting
networks, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences. In each application, the
matching model will be shown to induce a regular and convex matching game, and therefore
has nonempty core.
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Chapter 2. Applications of Convex Matching Games
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I provide three applications of the theory of convex matching games
introduced in Chapter 1. Aswewill see, convexity is satisfied by a different set of assumptions
in each of the three applications.
Section 2.2 provides the first application, where I consider a continuum large-economy
model. Contracts are assumed to be small, in the sense that the set of participants in each
contract is small compared to the economy as a whole. Each contract is interpreted as
an economic or social relationship among a group of agents, such as employment, school
enrollment, joint venture, or marriage. Given finitely many types of agents and continu-
ous preferences, I show that the core is always nonempty even with arbitrary contracting
networks, multilateral contracts, and continuous, possibly complementary, preferences. In
this application, the convexity condition is satisfied because of the assumptions of small
contracts, and convexity of preferences is not relevant. This model is closely related to one
of the results5 in Azevedo and Hatfield (2015), but my model is more general in that the set
of contract terms is allowed to be rich and agents are allowed to have continuous preferences
over a continuum of alternatives. The model in Azevedo and Hatfield (2015), by contrast,
is restricted to discrete contract terms, and agents are assumed to have strict preferences
over only finitely many alternatives. A rich set of contract terms in my model offers greater
5Remarkably, Azevedo and Hatfield (2015) offer three distinct results. Their first result (Section 4) is the
existence of stable matching in a continuum, two-sided, many-to-many matching market, provided that agents
on one side have substitutable preferences. Their second result (Section 5) is a nonempty core in a continuum
economy with a general contracting network, multilateral contracts, and arbitrary preferences, which is closely
related to, but less general than, my first application. Their third result (Section 6) is the existence of competitive
equilibria in a continuum economy with transferable utility.
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flexibility, in particular, to subsume transferable utility (TU) models by letting each contract
contain a term that specifies monetary transfers for all participants and letting all agents’ util-
ity functions be quasi-linear in money. Furthermore, each contract in Azevedo and Hatfield
(2015) is assumed to have only finitely many participants. Therefore, their large-economy
model can only be viewed as a limit of a sequence of economies where the number of agents
per contract is fixed, while the number of contracts grow proportionally to the size of the
economy. In my model, however, each contract is allowed to involve a continuum of agents
as long as the continuum has zero mass. This may provide a new way to approximate a large
economy, in which both the number of agents per contract and the number of contracts grow
sub-linearly with respect to the size of the economy.
My first application is also related to a sequence of papers by Myrna Wooders. In
Wooders (1983), Shubik and Wooders (1983), and Kovalenkov and Wooders (2003), an
approximate notion of the core is shown to be nonempty in a large, finite cooperative game
under mild regularity assumptions. In particular, the “small group effectiveness” condition in
Kovalenkov andWooders (2003) is similar to my small contract assumption. The small group
effectiveness condition was first formulated in Wooders (1992) for TU cooperative games
and later generalized to NTU games. It requires that “almost all gains to group formation
can be realized by partitions of the players into groups bounded in absolute size”, and it is
sufficient for a nonempty approximate core in large, finite cooperative games. By contrast,
the small contract assumption I introduce is for continuum economies and sufficient for the
nonemptiness of the exact core. Remarkably, Kaneko and Wooders (1986) and Kaneko and
Wooders (1996) prove the nonemptiness of the core for continuum NTU cooperative games.
In these two papers, however, each allocation is assumed to be a partition of players into
coalitions containing only finitely many players, and players across different coalitions are
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assumed to have no interaction. In my model, by contrast, a set of agents with positive mass
may be connected, directly or indirectly, through a set of contracts, although each contract
only involves a set of agents with zero mass. Another difference is that in those papers by
Wooders and her coauthors mentioned above, the model follows the tradition of cooperative
game theory and starts from the set of feasible payoff vectors for each coalition as primitives.
This approach abstracts from details on how coalitions of players function internally, while
my approach follows the tradition of matching theory and considers these details by taking
contracts as primitives.
Section 2.3 provides the second application, where I consider a finite-economy model
with multilateral contracts. I show that the core is nonempty if all agents have convex and
continuous preferences. The convexity of this matching game is satisfied in a straightforward
way because of the convexity of preferences. In this model, the terms of each contract
can vary continuously within a convex set, and each agent is assumed to have convex, but
not necessarily substitutable, preferences over terms of contracts that involve him or her.
In the contexts of consumption and production, having convex preferences over contract
terms corresponds to quasi-concave utility functions of consumption and quasi-convex cost
functions of production. When applied to pure exchange economies, the result reduces to
the classic one that the core is nonempty given convex preferences, but my model is more
general because goods are allowed to be agent-specific, which is a common feature shared
by existing matching models with contracts (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005). However, the
assumption of a convex set of contract terms in my model usually implies continuously
divisible goods, in contrast to standard matching models, which are able to handle indivisible
goods. My model is related to the multilateral-contract model in Hatfield and Kominers
(2015), where competitive equilibrium and, therefore, core allocations are shown to exist
15
under TU and concave utility functions. By contrast, my model does not assume TU and can
therefore be applied to markets in which utilities are imperfectly transferable. Another subtle
difference is that convexity of preferences in my model corresponds to the quasi-concavity
of utility functions, which is weaker than the concavity assumed in Hatfield and Kominers
(2015).
Section 2.4 provides the third application, where I study a large-firm, many-to-one
matching model with peer preferences. There are finitely many firms and a continuum of
workers in the market, and each firm is large in the sense that it can hire a continuum of
workers. Workers may have preferences over their peers, in the sense that they value not
only the firm for which they work but also the colleagues with whom they work. With peer
preferences, each contract in this model is multilateral because it involves a firm and the
set of all workers that firm employs. Because firms may hire a continuum of workers with
positive mass, the assumption of small contracts in the first application is not satisfied, and
therefore, this model is not a special case of the first application. In this model, I show that
the core is nonempty if all firms and workers have convex and continuous preferences, and
in addition, all workers’ preferences over peers satisfy a “competition aversion” condition.
Roughly speaking, the competition aversion condition requires that each worker does not
like colleagues of his or her own type, possibly because workers of the same type have to
compete for projects, resources, and promotions when employed by the same firm. A striking
observation is that the core may be empty without the competition aversion condition, even if
all firms and workers have convex and continuous preferences. As we will see, the convexity
of this matching game is only satisfied when the convexity of preferences is combined with
competition aversion. This model is related to that of Che, Kim, and Kojima (2017), which
shows that stablematchings always exist in a large-firm, many-to-onematchingmodel without
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peer preferences, provided that all firms have continuous and convex, but not necessarily
substitutable, preferences. By contrast, my model additionally allows for peer preferences
and highlights the importance of competition aversion for a nonempty core, although without
peer preferences, my notion of the core is slightly different from the notion of stablematchings
in Che, Kim, and Kojima (2017). Furthermore, their paper allows for a compact space of
worker types, but I only consider finitely many types of workers.
2.2 Large Economies with Small Contracts
In the first application, I consider a large-economy model with a continuum of agents,
which is shown to be a regular and convex matching game and, therefore, have a nonempty
core. The model allows for general contracting networks and multilateral contracts, the terms
of which are allowed to vary continuously. While agents can hold a bundle of contracts, I
only impose a continuity assumption on an agent’s preferences over bundles. In particular,
I do not assume agents’ preferences to be substitutable. Utility is non-transferable in this
model in general, but the model also accommodates the TU framework when each contract
contains a term that specifies monetary transfers for all participants and agents’ preferences
are quasi-linear in money. Moreover, this model accommodates coalition formation games in
the sense of Banerjee, Konishi, and Tayfun (2001), Cechlarova and Romero-Medina (2001),
and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) by restricting each agent to demand atmost one contract
at a time.
The nonempty core result only relies on three relatively mild assumptions. First, I
assume that there are finitely many types of agents in the economy. Agents of the same type
have the same preferences and are considered identical by all other agents. Second, I assume
that all contracts in the economy are small compared to the overall economy, in the sense
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that the set of participants in each contract has mass of zero, while the set of all agents in the
economy has positive mass. This assumption rules out global public goods that affect a large
set of agents, but it still allows us to consider local public goods that affect a continuum of
agents with zero mass. Third, I assume that preferences are continuous.
There is a finite set I of agent types in this economy. For each agent type i ∈ I, there
exists a mass mi > 0 of type-i agents. Let R be the set of all possible roles, where each role
r ∈ R specifies an agent’s tasks and compensations in an economic or social relationship
with other agents. For example, in the roommate matching context, a typical role r ∈ R can
be “being a type-1 agent in a type-1-2 match responsible for cleaning the kitchen but only
paying 40% of the rent”. Let us assume the set R of roles to be a compact metric space, and
roles that are close under the metric contain similar tasks and compensations.
In this economy, roles performed by different agents are coordinated by contracts, and
each contract type x ∈ X represents a consistent combination of roles in a certain economic
or social relationship among a group of agents. In applications, a contract may represent an
employment relationship between a firm and a worker, an enrollment relationship between a
school and a student, a joint venture by several firms, a marriage relationship between two
individuals, or any other relationship among people. Formally, each contract type x is a Borel
measure over the set R of roles, which represents the quantity of each role r ∈ R involved in a
type-x contract.6 Endow X with the weak-* topology, and let us assume that X is a compact
set that does not contain the zero measure over R.7
6The measure x may carry different units in different contexts. When x represents a type of contracts that
only involve finitely many agents, the measure x is integer-valued, measuring the head count of each role. When
x represents a type of contracts that contain a continuum of agents, the measure x is real-valued, carrying some
proper unit for the continuum.
7The weak-* topology on X is the weakest topology that makes the linear functional L f : X → R defined
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Each agent in this economy may wish to simultaneously participate in multiple relation-
ships with different groups of agents, in which case an agent will hold a bundle of multiple
roles. Let us assume that all agents demand at most N ∈ N roles at one time, and therefore,
an acceptable bundle β of roles is a Borel measure over R that assigns measure 1 to at most
N , possibly duplicate, roles in R. Let B be the set of all such bundles, and endow B with
the weak-* topology. Note that both a bundle β and a contract type x are a measure over R,
but they are conceptually unrelated because a bundle β measures the number of roles held by
one agent, while a contract of type x measures the number of roles contained in a contract,
most likely to be held by different agents. Each agent type i is associated with a complete
and transitive preference relation %i over B. Assume %i to be continuous in the sense that
all upper contour sets and lower contour sets are closed inB. A bundle β ∈ B is individually
rational (IR) for agent type i if β %i 0, where 0 is the zero measure over R that represents the
empty bundle. Let Bi be the set of nonempty IR bundles for type-i agents.8
An allocation µ specifies, for each i, the mass of type-i agents holding each nonempty IR
bundle β ∈ Bi, subject to some feasibility requirement. Formally, an allocation is µ := (µi)i∈I ,
where µi is a Borel measure over the set Bi of nonempty IR bundles for type-i agents. First,
feasibility requires the measure µi to respect the total mass constraint µi (Bi) ≤ mi for each
agent type i. Second, all roles present under the allocation µ = (µi)i∈I need to be able to fit
into a set of contracts, i.e., there exists a Borel measure µx over the set X of contract types
as




continuous in x for all continuous functions f : R → R. Under the weak-* topology, the compactness
assumption requires no more than boundedness and closedness, by the Banach-Alaoglu theorem. See Appendix
C for details.
8I can show that the set Bi is compact. Closedness is because of the continuity of %i , and removing the
empty bundle 0 from Bi is not a threat to closeness because a sequence of nonempty bundles never converges
to the empty bundle 0. See Appendix C for details.
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In the accounting identity above, both sides are measures over the set R of roles.9 The left-
hand side calculates the quantity of roles from the perspective of agents, while the right-hand
side calculates the same quantity from the perspective of contracts.
Define addition and scalar multiplication on allocations component-wise, i.e.,








but with the caveat that the set of feasible allocations is not always closed under these two
operations due to the total mass constraint. Among all feasible allocations, notice that there
is an empty allocation µ0 under which all agents hold the empty bundle and no contract is
present, i.e., µ0i is the zero measure.
The assumption of small contracts is implicit in the feasibility structure above. Notice
that if µ is a feasible allocation, then λµ with λ > 0 subject to the total mass constraint is
still a feasible allocation, in which the quantity of contracts of each type is multiplied by λ.
9To formally understand the accounting identity, on the left-hand side, each β is a measure over R, and µi
is a measure over βs. Therefore the integral
∫
β∈Bi βdµi is again a measure of R. More formally, the integral∫
β∈Bi βdµi is defined as the linear functional Lµi : C (R) → R








where C (R) is the set of continuous functions on R. By the mass constraint µi (Bi) ≤ mi , the linear functional
Lµi is bounded, and therefore, it is isomorphic to a finite Borel measure over R due to the Riesz representation
theorem. Analogously, the integral on the right-hand side is also interpreted as a measure over R.
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This implies that there must be a continuum of contracts of each type under an allocation,
and therefore, each contract can only involve a set of agents with zero mass. To see this
in another way, suppose, by contradiction, that there exists a type of large contracts, each
of which involves positive mass of agents. Then, an allocation can only contain finitely
many contracts of this type. When µ represents an allocation with one such contract, µ/2
cannot be interpreted as a feasible allocation, which contradicts the feasibility structure of
the model.
Now, we are in a position to define the notions of blocking and the core. Because a
block may involve a rich set of contracts arranged in an arbitrary way, it is convenient to
use nonempty allocations to represent all potential blocks. For a nonempty allocation µˆ to
block an allocation µ, we require that if bundle βˆ for type-i agents is present under the block
µˆ, we need to find a positive mass of type-i agents under allocation µ who are willing to
switch to βˆ. These type-i agents may come from two sources: (1) agents who hold the empty
bundle under allocation µ, and (2) agents who hold some nonempty bundle under µ that
is strictly less preferred to βˆ. Following these intuitive descriptions, we have the following
definition.
Definition 2.1 An allocation µ is blocked by a nonempty allocation µˆ, if for each i with
µˆi (Bi) > 0, we have either µi (Bi) < mi or µi
({
β ∈ Bi : βˆ i β
})
> 0 for all βˆ ∈ Supp (µˆi).
An allocation is in the core if it is not blocked by any nonempty allocation µˆ.10
Themodel formulated above is closely related to the second result (Section 5) ofAzevedo
10Conceptually, a block is identified by a set of contracts of certain types assigned to agents in a certain way,
and the mass of this set of contracts is irrelevant. Therefore, rigorously speaking, a block is the support of a
nonempty allocation µˆ. In the definition, I directly use nonempty allocations to represent blocks for the sake
of convenience, but bear in mind that µˆ and λµˆ, where λ is a small positive number, represent the same block.
This also explains why in the definition we only need to find a positive mass, instead of a sufficient mass, of
agents in the allocation µ who are willing to participate in the block µˆ.
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and Hatfield (2015), where the set R of roles, the set X of contracts, and the set of Bi of IR
bundles for type-i agents are assumed to be finite, and agents have strict preferences. This
level of discreteness makes their model difficult to compare with, for example, TU models, in
which monetary transfers can vary continuously. In contrast, the compact set of roles in my
model offers greater flexibility to accommodate TU models by letting each contract contain
a term that specifies monetary transfers for all participants and all agents’ utility functions be
quasi-linear in money. More generally, my model can also handle situations in which utility
is non-transferable or imperfectly transferable.
Furthermore, each contract in Azevedo and Hatfield (2015) is assumed to have only
finitely many participants. As a consequence, their model can only be interpreted as a limit
of a sequence of economies where the number of agents per contract is fixed, while the
number of contracts grows linearly with respect to the size of the economy. In my model,
however, each contract may also involve a continuum of agents as long as the continuum has
zero mass. Therefore, mymodel may provide another way to approximate a large economy, in
which both the number of agents per contract and the number of contracts grow sub-linearly
with respect to the size of the economy.
Now, let us consider a simplistic example to illustrate the model and clarify the nota-
tions.
Example 1 Consider a continuum roommate problemwith three types of agents, I = {1, 2, 3};
each type of agents has mass 1. Each pair of agents may choose to become roommates, but
all agents only accept a roommate of a different type than their own. Further, type-i agents
strictly prefer having a type-(i + 1) roommate to having a type-(i − 1) roommate and prefer
having a type-(i − 1) roommate to living alone.11 In this example, let us assume that no
11In this example, let 3 + 1 := 1 for indices of agent types.
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monetary transfer is allowed.
In the terminology of themodel, there are 6 roles R = {1/12, 2/12, 1/13, 3/13, 2/23, 3/23},
where i/i j represents the role “being a type-i agent in a roommateship between a type-i and
a type- j agent”. There are 3 contract types X = {12, 23, 13}, where i j := δi/i j + δ j/i j rep-
resents the type of roommateship that involves one type-i and one type- j agent.12 Because
each agent can only join at most one roommateship, the set of acceptable bundles is sim-





Moreover, we define %i on Bi s.t. δi/i,i+1 i δi/i,i−1.




is the mass of type-i agents in a type-i j







}) ≤ 1, and




= µx ({i j}) for each (i, j), where µx ({i j})
is the mass of type-i j roommateship. Notice that the accounting identity essentially requires









of type- j agents in a type-i j roommateship.
Let us further use the example above to illustrate the notions of blocking and the
core. Let µi j be the allocation under which each type-i or type- j agent is in a type-i j













x ({i j}) = 1. Using Definition 2.1, it is straightforward to verify that the
allocation µi,i−1 is blocked by µi,i+1. To see this, under the block µi,i+1, only type i and type
i+1 may hold a nonempty bundle, the only bundle for type i is δi/i,i+1, and the only bundle for
type i + 1 is δi+1/i,i+1. Under the allocation µi,i−1, we can find a positive mass of type-i agents
who are willing to accept the bundle δi/i,i+1 since, in fact, all type-i agents are holding the
less-preferred bundle δi/i,i−1. We can also find a positive mass of type-(i + 1) agents who are
12The measure δr over R is the Dirac measure that assigns measure 1 to r and measure 0 elsewhere.
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willing to accept the bundle δi+1/i,i+1 because, in fact, all type-(i + 1) agents are unmatched
under the allocation µi,i−1. Therefore, by Definition 2.1 the allocation µi,i−1 is blocked by
µi,i+1, and thus, the allocation µi,i−1 is not in the core. Therefore, none of the allocations µ12,




µ12 + µ23 + µ31
)
/2
where half of type-i agents are matched with type-(i+1) agents, and the other half are matched
with type-(i − 1) agents, for each agent type i.
The roommate example is a simplistic illustration of the model, as it only involves bilat-
eral contracts and unit-demand agents, where substitutability of preferences holds trivially.
The next example, by contrast, involves multilateral contracts, multi-demand agents, imper-
fectly transferable utility, and complementary preferences, and its aim is to demonstrate the
generality of the model.
Example 2 Consider a board game club in which people meet to play chess and bridge.
The bridge game involves four players and the chess game involves two players. There is a
continuum of male players and a continuum of female players. Players care about the gender
of their opponents in each round of the game they play. When playing chess, the players
additionally care about who moves first. When playing bridge, players may gamble, and they
value the stake s ∈ [0, 1]. No player demands more than 5 rounds of chess and 20 rounds
of bridge in one meeting. Each player’s preferences are defined over all rounds of chess
and bridge he/she plays during the meeting. See Appendix B for a formal description of this
example using the notations of the model.
This example involves multilateral contracts, multi-demand agents, imperfectly trans-
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ferable utility, and possibly complementary preferences. Contracts are multilateral because
bridge involves 4 players, and players have multi-demand because they wish to play multiple
rounds. The two players in a chess game can imperfectly transfer their payoffs by transferring
the right to move first. Furthermore, players’ preferences may exhibit complementarity. For
example, male players may insist that at least half of their opponents during a meeting must
be female. When this is the case, a male player will reject a round of chess against another
male player if this will be his only round of play but is likely to accept it if he has just played
two rounds of bridge against three female players. Moreover, because the amount staked s
on bridge can vary continuously in [0, 1], this example is outside the scope of Azevedo and
Hatfield (2015).
Now, let us relate the model to the framework of convex matching games introduced in
the previous section. A large-economy model with small contracts induces a matching game
G = {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I}, where I is the set of agent types andM is the set of feasible allocations.
The characteristic vector of an allocation µ is defined as φ (µ) := (µi (Bi) /mi)i∈I , i.e., φi (µ)
represents the fraction of type-i agents holding some nonempty bundle under allocation µ.
Let Mi := {µ ∈ M : µi (Bi) > 0} be the set of allocations that involve a positive mass of
type-i agents, and define the domination relation Ai from Mi to M s.t. µˆ Ai µ if either
µi (Bi) < mi or µi
({
β ∈ Bi : βˆ i β
})
> 0 for all βˆ ∈ Supp (µˆi). In words, µˆ dominates µ
at agent type i if, for every bundle βˆ that might be held by type-i agents under µˆ, there is
positive mass of type-i agents under µ who are willing to switch to βˆ. It is straightforward to
verify that the core of the induced matching game G as defined in Definition 1.1 reduces to
that defined in Definition 2.1.
Now let us state the regularity of the induced matching game G.
Proposition 2.2 The matching game induced by a large-economy model with small contracts
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is regular.
Proof. See Appendix C.
For the regularity of G, the topology we endowM with is again the weak-* topology,
which in this context is the weakest topology that makes
∫
β∈Bi f dµi continuous in µ for each
i ∈ I and each continuous function f : Bi → R. The closedness of a set of unblocked
allocations is a result of the continuous preference relation %i. The detailed arguments are
in Appendix C.
Furthermore, we can also show that the induced matching game G has the convex
structure defined in Definition 1.2.
Proposition 2.3 The matching game induced by a large-economy model with small contracts
is convex.
Proof. Let us check the three requirements of a convex matching game.
(1) The allocation spaceM is a subset of the vector space
{
µ =
((µi)i∈I ) : µi is a finite signed Borel measure over Bi, for each i}
with addition and scalarmultiplication defined component-wise. Clearly, the empty allocation







) ≤ 1, where w j > 0 and µ j ∈ M for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then the
linear combination µ :=
∑m
j=1 w


























x∈X xdµx holds because it holds for each µ
j and is preserved under the linear combina-
tion.
(3) For each µ ∈ Mi, let βi (µ) be the set of worst nonempty bundles for type-i agents
under allocation µ, i.e.,
β
i
(µ) := arg min
%i
Supp (µi)
The minimizers exist because Supp (µi) is closed in Bi, which is compact, and %i is contin-
uous.13 Define the relation Di overMi s.t. µ′ Di µ if βi (µ′) %i βi (µ), where βi (µ) should
be viewed as an arbitrary selection from the minimizers, and the relation Di defined clearly
does not depend on the selection.
Now consider a φi-convex combination µ :=
∑m
j=1 w














) ≤ 1. Further assume that µ j Di µˆ for each of its
component µ j ∈ Mi. Clearly, µ is a feasible allocation by (2), and it is sufficient to show that
µˆ bi µ. By definition, we need to show that µi (Bi) = mi and µi
({
β ∈ Bi : βi (µˆ) i β
})
= 0,
i.e., all type-i agents are holding some nonempty bundle under allocation µ, and all bundles















13The minimizers in Supp (µi) can be obtained by taking the intersection of all lower contour sets within
Supp (µi). The intersection is nonempty because Supp (µi) is compact, all lower contour sets are closed, and
the intersection of finitely many lower contour sets is nonempty.
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Second, arbitrarily take a bundle β ∈ Supp (µi). Because




















(µˆ), where the second %i is due to µ j0 Di µˆ. Therefore, the set
{
β ∈ Bi : βi (µˆ) i β
}
is
disjoint with Supp (µi) and thus has zero measure.
Intuitively, the convexity of a matching game requires that µˆ does not dominate a φi-
convex combination of a set of Di-better allocations at player i. In the large-economy model
with small contracts, the relation Di is obtained by comparing the worst nonempty bundles
under two allocations. To understand how convexity is satisfied by the large-economy model
with small contracts, first notice that under the φi-convex combination, all type-i agents are







= 1 by definition. Furthermore, every
bundle β that is possibly held by type-i agents under the φi-convex combination must come
from some component µ j0 of it that involves type-i agents. By assumption, we have µ j0 Di µˆ,
which implies that the bundle β is weakly preferred by type-i agents to the worst bundle under
µˆ. As a consequence, under the φi-convex combination, no type-i agent is willing to switch
to the worst bundle under µˆ, and therefore, µˆ does not dominate µ at agent type i. Notice that
the convexity of the induced matching game is satisfied purely because of the structure of the
game and is irrelevant to convex preferences.
With regularity and convexity, by Theorem 1.4, we have the following nonempty core
result.
Theorem 2.4 In the large-economy model with small contracts, the core is always nonempty.
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This nonempty core result is remarkably general because, essentially, only three assump-
tions have been made: (1) small contracts, (2) finitely many agent types, and (3) continuous
preferences. It does not rely on the two-sided structure of the market, substitutable prefer-
ences, or TU, in contrast to the existing results for various core-like solution concepts in the
matching literature.
The continuum roommate example (Example 1) serves as an ideal illustration of how
Scarf’s lemma and convexity work together to give us nonempty core. Consider the three
allocations µ12, µ23, and µ31, which induce the matrix A:
µ12 µ23 µ31
Type 1 1 0 1
Type 2 1 1 0
Type 3 0 1 1
whose rows are indexed by agent types and columns are indexed by the three allocations. For
each row i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and column µ ∈ {µ12, µ23, µ31}, the (i, µ)-th entry is the fraction of
matched type-i agents under µ. For each row i, we define µi,i+1 Di µi,i−1 since type-i agents
prefer a type-(i + 1) roommate to a type-(i − 1) roommate. I use bold 1 to indicate the more
preferred allocation for each row.
Scarf’s lemma asserts that there exists a vector in the polyhedron
{
w ∈ R3+ : Aw ≤ 1
}
that dominates all columns. In this example, it is not difficult to verify that this dominating
vector is unique, which is w∗ := (1/2, 1/2, 1/2). Then, allocation µ∗ is constructed as the












For each i, the allocation µ∗ is a φi-convex combination of µ12, µ23, and µ31, and the relevant
µi,i+1 and µi,i−1 are both Di-better than µi,i−1. By convexity, the allocation µi,i−1 does not
dominate µ∗ at player i, i.e., no type-i agent under µ∗ has incentive to switch to µi,i−1.
Therefore the allocation µ∗ is in the core.
The assumption of small contracts plays an important role in convexity of the matching
game. The following example shows that when contracts are large, convexity may fail and
the core may be empty even in a continuum economy.
Example 3 Consider a continuum of agents of three types, each of which has mass 1. Any
set of agents with total mass no greater than 2 can form a coalition, and each agent can
participate in at most one coalition. Each agent values the mass of each type of agents in the
coalition in which he participates. The preferences of a type-i agent are represented by the
utility function
ui (x) = xi · (9 + 2xi+1 + xi−1)
where x ∈ [0, 1]3 is the mass vector of the coalition in which he participates. The utility of
being alone is 0.
It can be shown that the core is empty in this example, and the detailed arguments
are left for Appendix A. As a brief insight, notice that with the preferences specified above,
agents of the same type have a strong incentive to participate in the same coalition. When
all type-i agents participate in one coalition (xi = 1), their utility is at least 9. However, if,
for example, they are equally separated into two coalitions (xi = 1/2), their utility is at most
1/2 · (9 + 2 + 1) = 6. In fact, we can show that all agents of the same type must stay together in
the same coalition; otherwise, the allocation is blocked. With this observation, a continuum
of three types of agents is equivalent to three discrete agents, and we are essentially back to
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the unstable roommate problem in Gale and Shapley (1962), where the core is empty.
In fact, the large coalition formation model in the example above fails the convexity
condition. While using the Scarf’s lemma approach to obtain a core allocation, the matrix
A is the same as that in the continuum roommate example, and we obtain the same unique
dominating vector w∗ = (1/2, 1/2, 1/2). Without convexity, however, we cannot interpret this
dominating vector w∗ as a core allocation.
2.3 Finite Economies with Convex Preferences
As the second application, I show that the core is nonempty in a finite-economy model
with multilateral contracts if all agents have convex and continuous preferences. In this
model, the terms of each contract may vary continuously within a convex set, and each
agent is assumed to have convex, but not necessarily substitutable, preferences over terms of
contracts that involve him. When applied to general equilibrium models, the result reduces
to the classic one whereby the core is nonempty given convex preferences and production
technologies, but my model is more general because goods are allowed to be agent-specific,
which is a common feature shared by existing matching models with contracts (Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005)). Moreover, my model does not assume TU and can therefore be applied to
markets in which utilities are imperfectly transferable.
Consider an economy with a finite set I of agents who interact through a finite set X of
pre-contracts. Each pre-contract x ∈ X involves a nonempty set Ix ⊂ I of agents and has a set
Tx of contract terms. In this setup, a contract is a pre-contract x ∈ X paired with a contract
term tx ∈ Tx . Let us assume that for each pre-contract x ∈ X , the setTx of its terms is a convex
and compact subset of a normed vector space. Further, let Tx contain the zero vector 0x of
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the normed vector space, which represents the null contract under which the pre-contract x is
inactive. For example, a pre-contract type x ∈ X may be “agent i sells apples to agent j”, and
we have Ix = {i, j}. A contract term tx ∈ Tx may be (10, 15), which represents “agent i sells
10 pounds of apples to agent j, and j pays i $15”. Under the null contract term (0, 0) ∈ Tx ,
agent i sells no apples to agent j and j pays i nothing, and therefore, the pre-contract x is
inactive. More generally, the contract terms may quantities, prices, probabilities, time share,
etc.
For each agent i, let Xi := {x ∈ X : i ∈ Ix} be the set of pre-contracts that involve agent
i, and each agent i only cares about the terms of the pre-contracts in Xi. Formally, each agent
i has a complete and transitive preference relation %i over Ti :=
∏
x∈Xi
Tx . Let us assume that
agents have convex and upper semi-continuous preferences, in the sense that for each i, the
upper contour set
{
ti ∈ Ti : ti %i tˆi
}
is convex and closed for all tˆi ∈ Ti.
In this economy, an allocation is t = (tx)x∈X , under which each pre-contract x is assigned
a term tx ∈ Tx . Let T¯ :=
∏
x∈X
Tx be the allocation space. Notice that there is an empty allocation
0 ∈ T¯ , under which each pre-contract x is assigned its null term 0x , and therefore, all pre-
contracts are inactive. Given an allocation t ∈ T¯ , let It := {i ∈ I : ∃ x ∈ Xi s.t. tx , 0x} be




Tx onto the subspace
∏
x∈Xi
Tx . Let T denote the set of IR allocations, i.e.,
T :=
{
t ∈ T¯ : ti %i 0i for all i
}
Now we are in a position to define blocking and the core. Intuitively, an allocation tˆ
blocks allocation t if all agents involved in tˆ strictly prefer tˆ to t.
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Definition 2.5 An IR allocation t ∈ T is blocked by a nonempty IR allocation tˆ ∈ T\ {0}
if tˆi i ti for each i ∈ Itˆ . An IR allocation t ∈ T is in the core if it is not blocked by any
tˆ ∈ T\ {0}.
Thismodel is related toHatfield andKominers (2015), inwhich competitive equilibrium,
and therefore core allocations, are shown to exist under TU and concave utility functions.
In their model, each contract term tx ∈ Tx is a combination of a non-monetary term and
the monetary transfer for all participants in pre-contract x. All agents’ utility functions are
quasi-linear in money and concave in the non-monetary term. By contrast, my model does
not assume TU and can therefore be applied to markets in which utilities are imperfectly
transferable. Another subtle difference is that convexity of preferences in my model corre-
sponds to quasi-concavity of utility functions, which is weaker than the concavity assumed
in Hatfield and Kominers (2015).
Now, let us relate the model to the framework of convex matching games introduced in
Section 1.3. The finite-economy model with convex preferences induces a matching game
G = {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I} in the following way. Let I be the set of agents andM := T be the set
of IR allocations. The characteristic vector of an allocation t ∈ T is defined as
φi (t) :=

1, if i ∈ It
0, otherwise
for each i, i.e., the characteristic value φi (t) indicates whether agent i is involved in some
non-null contract under allocation t. LetMi := {t ∈ T : φi (t) = 1} be the set of allocations
that involve agent i, and define the domination relationAi fromMi toM s.t. tˆ Ai t if tˆi i ti.
In words, allocation tˆ dominates t at agent i if agent i under allocation t is willing to switch
to tˆ. It is straightforward to verify that the core of the induced matching game G as defined
33
in Definition 1.1 reduces to that defined in Definition 2.5.
Now let us make the crucial observation that the induced matching game has the convex
structure defined in Definition 1.2. The convexity of the induced matching game is a direct
result of convex preferences.
Proposition 2.6 With convex preferences, the matching game induced by the finite-economy
model is convex.
Proof. Let us check the three requirements of a convex matching game.
(1) Because each Tx is a subset of a vector space, the allocation spaceM := T is a subset
of the product vector space, with addition and scalar multiplication defined component-wise.







) ≤ 1, where w j > 0 and t j ∈ M for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then the
linear combination t :=
∑m
j=1 w





w j t ji =
m∑
j:φi(t j)=1










) ≤ 1, and therefore, t is a feasible allocation. Further-




= 1, by the convexity of %i, we have ti %i 0i.
Therefore, allocation t is IR.









) ≤ 1. Further assume that t j Di tˆ for each of its components t j ∈ Mi. Clearly,






w j t ji =
m∑
j:t j∈Mi











= 1 and %i is convex.
We can also demonstrate the regularity of the matching game G induced by the finite-
economy model given upper semi-continuous preferences.
Proposition 2.7 With upper semi-continuous preferences, the matching game induced by the
finite-economy model is regular.
Proof. (1) Compactness of T .










Tx and each Tx is compact, we know that T¯ is compact. By the upper
semi-continuity of %i, the set
{
t ∈ T¯ : ti %i 0i
}
is closed in T¯ . Thus, T is closed in T¯ and
therefore compact.
(2) Closedness of sets of undominated allocations.
The set
{




t ∈ T : ti %i tˆi
}
is closed by the upper semi-continuity of%i.
With convexity and regularity, by Theorem 1.4, we have the following nonempty core
result.
Theorem 2.8 With convex and upper semi-continuous preferences, the finite economy has a
nonempty core.
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2.4 Large-firm Matching with Peer Preferences
As the third application, I study a large-firm many-to-one matching model with peer
preferences. There are finitely many firms and a continuum of workers in the market, and
each firm is large in the sense that it can hire a continuum of workers. Workers may have
preferences over their peers, in the sense that they value not only the firm for which they work
but also the colleagues with whom they work. With peer preferences, each contract in this
model is multilateral and involves a firm and the set of all workers the firm employs. Notice
that the nonempty core result in Section 2.2 does not apply because contracts are large since
firms may hire a continuum of workers with positive mass.
In this model, I show that the core is nonempty if all firms and workers have convex
and continuous preferences and, in addition, all workers’ preferences over peers satisfy a
“competition aversion” condition. Roughly speaking, the competition aversion condition
requires that each worker does not like colleagues of his own type, possibly because workers
of the same type have to compete for projects, resources, and promotions when employed by
the same firm. A striking observation is that the core may be empty without the competition
aversion condition, even if all firms and workers have convex and continuous preferences. In
other words, convexity of preferences is not sufficient for convexity of the induced match-
ing game, in contrast to the model in the last section. As we will see, convexity of the
induced matching game is only satisfied when convexity of preferences is combined with the
competition aversion condition.
Consider a finite set F of firms and a continuum of workers of finitely many types. Let
Θ be the set of worker types, and for each worker type θ ∈ Θ, let m (θ) > 0 be the mass of
type-θ workers in the market. Then, a set of workers can be represented by a non-negative
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mass vector x ∈ RΘ+ subject to the constraint x (θ) ≤ m (θ). Let X be the set of all such




f ∈F , where µ f ∈ X is the mass vector
representing the set of workers employed by firm f . For the matching µ to be feasible, it has
to respect the total mass of workers of each type, i.e.,
∑
f ∈F µ f ≤ m.
The firms’ preferences are defined over sets of workers. Formally, each firm f has a
complete and transitive preference relation % f over X that is assumed to be upper semi-
continuous and convex, i.e., the upper contour set
{
x ∈ X : x % f x0
}
is closed and convex
for each x0 ∈ X . Workers value not only the firm for which they work but also the colleagues
with whom they work, and therefore, each worker has a complete and transitive preference
relation %θ over (F × X) ∪ {∅}. The pair ( f , x) ∈ F × X represents the state of being
employed by firm f and the whole set of f ’s employees is represented by the mass vector x.
The symbol ∅ represents the state of being unemployed. Let us assume each worker type θ’s
preference relation %θ to be upper semi-continuous and convex, i.e., the upper contour set
{x ∈ X : ( f , x) %θ a} is closed and convex, for each alternative a ∈ (C × Xθ) ∪ {∅} and each
firm f ∈ F.
We say that a match ( f , x) ∈ F × X is IR if firm f and the workers involved in x find
the match acceptable, i.e., x % f 0 and ( f , x) %θ ∅ for each worker type θ with x (θ) > 0. A
feasible matching µ is said to be IR if
(
f , µ f
)
is IR for all firms f ∈ F. LetM be the set of
all feasible and IR matchings. Notice that there is an empty matching µ0 ∈ M under which
all workers are unemployed, i.e., µ0f = 0 for all f ∈ F. In the remainder of this section, a
matching always refers to a feasible and IR matching, unless otherwise stated.
Now let us define the notions of blocking and the core.
Definition 2.9 A matching µ ∈ M is blocked by a nonempty matching µˆ ∈ M\ {µ0} if for
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each f ∈ F with µ f , 0, we have µˆ f  f µ f and for each fˆ and θ with µˆ fˆ (θ) > 0, we have
either
∑
f ∈F µ f (θ) < m (θ) or there exists f ∈ F with µ f (θ) > 0 s.t. ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) θ
(
f , µ f
)
. A
matching µ ∈ M is in the core if it is not blocked by a nonempty matching.
Intuitively, a matching µˆ blocks another matching µ if all firms involved in the block
µˆ are willing to switch to µˆ from µ, and for each worker type θ that is employed by firm
fˆ under the block µˆ, we have to find a positive mass of type-θ workers under µ who are
willing to switch to ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ). These type-θ workers may come from two sources: workers are
unemployed under µ and workers who are employed by some firm f under µ, but strictly
prefer ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) to
(
f , µ f
)
.
This model is related to the recent paper by Che, Kim, and Kojima (2017), who show
that stable matchings always exist in a large-firm many-to-one matching model without
peer preferences, provided that all firms have continuous and convex, but not necessarily
substitutable, preferences. Without peer preferences, my notion of the core is slightly different
from the notion of stable matchings in Che, Kim, and Kojima (2017). Moreover, their paper
allows for a compact space of worker types, but I only consider finitely many types of
workers.
Surprisingly, the assumptions of convexity and upper semi-continuity I have imposed
on preferences thus far are not sufficient for a nonempty core. The following provides a
counter-example.
Example 4 Consider two firms and three worker types θ1, θ2, and θ3, and each type of
worker has a mass of 1. All firms strictly prefer to have more workers but have a capacity
constraint of mass 2. For each worker type θi, all type-θi workers’ preferences over F × X
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are represented by the utility function
ui ( f , x) = xi · (9 + 2xi+1 + xi−1)
According to preferences specified above, the two firms are essentially dummy agents that pas-
sively accept workers. Therefore, this example is equivalent to the large coalition formation
example (Example 3), in which the core is empty.
As in Example 3, the crucial observation from the example above is that if workers of
the same type have a strong incentive to stay together by working for the same firm, the model
essentially becomes a finite roommate problem, in which the core may very well be empty.
Therefore, to obtain a nonempty core, some assumption has to be made such that agents of
the same type are willing to be separated into different firms. Following the observation
above, I find that the following additional restriction on workers’ preferences is sufficient for
a nonempty core.
Definition 2.10 The workers of type θ ∈ Θ are competition-averse if ( f , x′) %θ ( f , x) for
every pair of IR matches with x (θ) > 0 and x′ (θ) = 0.
The competition aversion restriction defined above requires that a type-θ worker ap-
proaches his bliss point when the mass of type-θ colleagues approaches 0. This implies
that the worker does not like colleagues of the same type, possibly due to competition for
projects, resources, and promotions among the same type of workers employed by the same
firm. Admittedly, in applications where there is strong synergy between workers of the same
type, the competition aversion condition is not satisfied, and so the core is not guaranteed
to be nonempty. As Example 3 demonstrates, if same-type synergy is sufficiently strong
that all workers of the same type always wish to stay together in one firm, we are back to a
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finite coalition formation problem where the core is often empty. However, if the same-type
synergy is dominated by the competition effect, then the competition aversion condition is a
reasonable assumption, in which case the core is guaranteed to be nonempty.
Now, let us relate the model to the framework of convex matching games introduced in
Section 1.3. The large-firm matching model with peer preferences induces a matching game
G = {I,M, φ, (Ai)i∈I} in the following way. Let I := F ∪Θ, andM be the set of feasible IR
matchings. The characteristic vector of an allocation µ ∈ M is defined as
φ f (µ) :=

1, if µ f , 0
0, otherwise
, for each f ∈ F
φθ (µ) :=
∑
f ∈F µ f (θ)
m (θ) , for each θ ∈ Θ
i.e., the characteristic value φ f (µ) indicates whether firm φ is involved in matching µ,
and φθ (µ) represents the fraction of type-θ workers employed under matching µ. Let
Mi := {µ ∈ M : φi (µ) > 0} for each i ∈ F ∪Θ, and define the domination relation Ai from
Mi toM. For a firm f , let µˆ A f µ if µˆ f  f µ f , i.e., firm f prefers the set of employees
under µˆ to µ. For a worker of type θ, let µˆ Aθ µ if either
∑
f ∈F µ f (θ) < m (θ) or for each
fˆ with µˆ fˆ (θ) > 0 there exists f ∈ F with µ f (θ) > 0 s.t. ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) θ
(
f , µ f
)
. In words, a
matching µˆ dominates a matching µ at worker type θ if there exists a positive mass of type-θ
workers under matching µ willing to switch to any position for type-θ workers in matching
µˆ. It is straightforward to verify that the core of the induced matching game G as defined in
Definition 1.1 reduces to that defined in Definition 2.9.
Now let us make the crucial observation that the induced matching game has the convex
structure defined in Definition 1.2. The convexity of the induced matching game is a result
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of convex preferences and competition aversion.
Proposition 2.11 If all firms and workers have convex preferences and all workers are
competition-averse, the matching game induced by the large-firm matching model with peer
preferences is convex.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Intuitively, the convexity of a matching game requires that for each i, an allocation
µˆ ∈ Mi does not dominate a φi-convex combination of a set ofDi-better allocations at player
i. In this model, the convexity of preferences alone is insufficient for the convexity of the
induced matching game. This is because the relation Dθ is only concerned with the firms
that employ a positive mass of type-θ agents, but some of the components of a φθ-convex
combination may involve firms that do not employ type-θ workers. Therefore, to ensure
that the φθ-convex combination is unblocked, we need to require that a mass vector x with
x (θ) = 0 is preferred to mass vectors with x (θ) > 0. In this large-firm model with peer
preferences, a notable difference from the first application in this paper is that a component
of a φθ-convex combination with φθ (µ) = 0 may affect type θ workers’ payoff, while in a
large economy with small contracts, a component with φi (µ) = 0 is not relevant to type-i
agents.
Moreover, we can demonstrate the regularity of the matching game G induced by the
large-firm matching model, given upper semi-continuous preferences.
Proposition 2.12 If all firms and workers have upper semi-continuous preferences, the
matching game induced by the large-firm matching model with peer preferences is regu-
lar.
Proof. (1) Compactness ofM.
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Let M¯ be the set of feasible but not necessarily IR matchings, i.e.,
M¯ :=
µ = (µ f ) f ∈F : µ f ∈ RΘ+ and
∑
f ∈F
µ f ≤ m

Clearly, M¯ is compact (w.r.t. Euclidean metric). Then, the spaceM of feasible IR matchings













µ ∈ M¯ : ( f , µ f ) %θ ∅ for each f with µ f (θ) > 0}
The setM f is closed by upper the semi-continuity of % f , and the setMθ is closed by the
upper semi-continuity of %θ . Therefore,M is closed in M¯ and thus compact.
(2) Closedness of sets of undominated allocations.
For each firm f , the set
{




µ ∈ M : µ f % f µˆ f
}
is closed by the upper semi-continuity of % f .
For each worker type θ, the set
{
µ ∈ M : µˆ b f µ
}
can be represented as
{
µ ∈ M : ∑ f ∈F µ f (θ) = m (θ)}
∩
⋃
fˆ ∈F:µˆ fˆ (θ)>0
{




µ ∈ M : ∑ f ∈F µ f (θ) = m (θ)} is closed. Moreover, the set
{
µ ∈ M : ( f , µ f ) %θ ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) for each f with µ f (θ) > 0}
is closed by the upper semi-continuity of % f .
With convexity and regularity, by Theorem 1.4, we have the following nonempty core
result.
Theorem 2.13 In the large-firm matching model with peer preferences, the core is nonempty
if all firms and workers have upper semi-continuous and convex preferences and all workers
are competition-averse.
The model subsumes the case in which workers have no peer preferences by letting
( f , x′) ∼θ ( f , x) for all x, x′ ∈ X . Thus, the next corollary is immediate.
Corollary 2.14 In the large-firm matching model without peer preferences, the core is
nonempty if all firms and workers have upper semi-continuous and convex preferences.
The corollary above does not subsume the main result of Che, Kim, and Kojima (2017),
as their notion of stable matchings is slightly different from my notion of the core. Further-
more, their model allows for a compact space of worker types, but I only consider finitely
many types of workers.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, three distinct applications of the framework of convex matching games
are provided. In each application, the model induces a regular and convex game, and therefore
has nonempty core.
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As a final remark, the solution concept studied in my framework of convex matching
games is the notion of core, while the notion of stability is also widely used in matching
theory literature. These two notions are very similar but different in subtle ways. Neither
implies the other in general, and in fact the core and the set of stable matchings may be
both nonempty but disjoint. In special cases, however, core and stability are more closely
related, which allows us to show the existence of stable matchings by showing nonempty core
under some modified preferences. I use a special case of Azevedo and Hatfield (2015) as an
example to illustrate how this can be done in Appendix E.
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Chapter 3. Consistency Requirement of Expected Utility Models
3.1 Introduction
Information economics typically assumes a decision maker (DM) who relies on her
belief over states to evaluate possible actions using expected utility14. The DM’s utility
function is state-dependent, and she updates her belief upon receiving new information, and
subsequently changes her preferences over actions.
In this chapter, I provide a new test of this expected utility framework. Because pref-
erences may change when beliefs are updated, rational choices across different information
scenarios need not be transitive: for instance, the DM choosing a over b, b over c, c over
a, in three distinct information scenarios, need not contradict rationality. However, I show
that some form of cyclic choice pattern even across distinct information scenarios should be
regarded as inconsistent with the linearity of preferences in beliefs. For instance, if there
are two payoff-relevant states, then a DM preference ordering a > b > c under one belief,
b > c > a under another belief, and c > a > b in yet another belief, violate the linearity
assumption in expected utility models.
Let’s consider a concrete context to demonstrate the main result of this paper. Consider
a case with two suspects of a crime. Police investigations show that one and only one of the
two suspects committed the crime. The court is trying to make a decision regarding which
suspect to convict, and three possible actions are
• Action 0: Convict no one
14See, for example, Crawford and Sobel (1982), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011).
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• Action 1: Convict Suspect #1
• Action 2: Convict Suspect #2
Evidence will be submitted to the court throughout the process of the trial. Upon
receiving new evidence, the jurors update their beliefs, and therefore their preferences change
over time. Suppose that a juror has the following three preference orderings over the three
actions at three distinct times:
• Preference (1): 0  1  2
• Preference (2): 2  0  1
• Preference (3): 1  2  0
Now the interesting question is: Can we explain the observed preference pattern of the
juror by an expected utility model? Formally, does there exist a Bernoulli utility function
of the juror defined over action-state pairs, together with three beliefs at the three distinct
times that rationalizes the three preference orderings respectively, assuming the juror to be
an expected utility maximizer? The answer to this question turns out to be negative. The
set of three preference orderings above constitute what I call a 3-cycle, which I will show is
inconsistent with the expected utility framework given only two payoff-relevant states in this
case. The limited number of payoff-relevant states limits the degrees of freedom we have to
rationalize a set of preference orderings, even though the Bernoulli utility function and beliefs
can be chosen arbitrarily. More generally, I am going to show that given n payoff-relevant
states, an (n + 1)-cycle is not rationalizable by expected utility models.
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3.2 Model
Consider a decision maker (DM) choosing over a set A of actions under uncertainty. Let
Ω be the set of all payoff relevant states, and I assumeΩ to be finite. Given some information
available to theDM, shewill form certain belief over the states, and then evaluate actions using
expected utility. This is the decision framework shared by a variety of information-theoretic
models, including Crawford and Sobel (1982), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992),
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). Different from this strand of literature, I’m going to abstract
away from specific information structures as well as how the DM updates her belief.
An information scenario i indexes the information available to the DM at some stage
before a decision is made, and let pii be the DM’s posterior belief over states given the
information available in scenario i. For the purpose of this paper, the specific information
available in scenario i is not relevant, neither is the way the DM updates her belief. Let I
be the set of all information scenarios in question. In each information scenario i ∈ I, with
belief pii the DM evaluates each action using expected utility and then obtains her preference
relation %i on A.
Let’s summarize the decision framework discussed above by the following defini-
tion.
Definition 3.1 A set of preference relations {%i}i∈I across different information scenarios
admits an expected utility (EU) representation if there exists a Bernoulli utility function
u : A × Ω → R together with beliefs {pii}i∈I ⊂ ∆ (Ω) s.t. for each information scenario





pii (ω) u (a, ω)
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Notice that the only assumption of this expected utility framework is, as the terminology
suggests, the linearity of the utility function in beliefs. Now let’s define the cyclic pattern
which I am going to show is inconsistent with the expected utility framework.
Definition 3.2 A set of preference relations {%i}i∈I across different information scenarios
contains an k-cycle, if there exist a set of k information scenarios i1, i2, . . . , ik ∈ I and a set
of k actions a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ A s.t.
%i1 : ak i1 ak−1 i1 ak−2 i1 · · · i1 a1
%i2 : a1 i2 ak i2 ak−1 i2 · · · i2 a2
%i3 : a2 i3 a1 i3 ak i3 · · · i3 a3
...
%ik : ak−1 ik ak−2 ik · · · ik a1 ik ak
Notice that if a set of preference relations {%i}i∈I indeed contains a k-cycle, we must
have |I | ≥ k and |A| ≥ k in the first place. As a special case of the definition above, the
juror’s preferences discussed in the introduction clearly contains a 3-cycle.
Now it is ready to formally state the main result of this chapter.
Theorem 3.3 With only n payoff-relevant states, a set of preference relations {%i}i∈I across
different information scenarios that contains an (n + 1)-cycle does not admit an expected
utility representation.
In other words, with n payoff-relevant states, an expected utility maximizer cannot
exhibit an (n + 1)-cycle in her preferences across information scenarios. The intuition is that
with |Ω| = n, the belief space ∆ (Ω) only has n−1 degrees of freedom, which is not sufficient
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to accommodate the n + 1 distinct preference relations in an (n + 1)-cycle.
My proof relies on a simple result in convex geometry, which is known as Radon’s
theorem, first introduced by Radon (1921). It can also be seen in, for example, Peterson
(1972).
Theorem 3.4 (Radon 1921) Any set of n + 1 points in Rn−1 can be partitioned into two sets
whose convex hulls intersect.
Let’s now prove the main theorem by contradiction.
Proof of the Main Result. Suppose that the set of preference relations {%i}i∈I in the main
theorem admits an expected utility representation. By definition, there exists a Bernoulli
utility function u : A×Ω→ R together with beliefs {pii}i∈I ⊂ ∆ (Ω) s.t. for each information
scenario i ∈ I, the associated preference relation %i is represented by the utility function
Ui : A→ R defined as Ui (a) := ∑ω∈Ω pii (ω) u (a, ω).
Let the (n + 1)-cycle contained in the DM’s preferences {%i}i∈I involve information sce-
narios i1, i2, . . . , in+1 and actions a1, a2, . . . , an+1, and by definition, for each k = 1, 2, . . . , n+1,
we have a j ik a j−1 for all j , k. (For notational convenience in this proof, let’s define
1 − 1 := n + 1.)
Because∆ (Ω) is (n − 1)-dimensional, by Radon’s theorem the set of beliefs {piik }lk=1 can




















intersect. Let pi∗ ∈ ∆ (Ω) be a belief in the intersection of the two convex hulls. Let %∗ be
the preference relation over A induced by the utility function U∗ (a) := ∑ω∈Ω pi∗ (ω) u (a, ω),
and clearly %∗ is a transitive relation.
Now I am going to show that a j ∗ a j−1 for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1, which contradicts
the transitivity of %∗ and concludes the proof. To see this, if j ∈ T1, we have a j ik a j−1 for
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and utility is linear in
beliefs. Symmetrically, if j ∈ T2, we have a j ik a j−1 for all k ∈ T1, and therefore a j ∗ a j−1






. This concludes the proof of the main result.
The result is in fact stronger than what it formally states, since a set of preference
relations {%i}i∈I may implicitly contain a cycle rather than explicitly does so, in which case
we can still conclude that the set of preference relations does not admit an expected utility
representation. For example, let’s consider the following set of four preference orderings over
three actions 1, 2, and 3:
%1: 1 1 2 1 3
%2: 1 2 3 2 2
%3: 2 3 3 3 1
%4: 3 4 2 4 1
We can verify that no 3-cycle is contained in this set of preference relations, and therefore
Theorem 3.3 does not apply directly. However, we can still conclude that this set of preference
relations does not admit an expected utility representation under 2 states because it contains
a 3-cycle implicitly in the following sense. Notice that %1 and %3 have the same relative
ranking of action 2 and 3, but one ranks action 1 as the top choice and the other ranks action 1
as the last choice. Then there must be some convex combination of the corresponding beliefs
pi1 and pi3 that induces the preference ordering
%5: 2 5 1 5 3
which ranks action 1 in the middle. Then the preference relations %2, %4, and %5 form a
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3-cycle, and therefore do not admit an expected utility representation under 2 states. In this
example, the set of preference relations {%i}4i=1 does not explicitly contain a 3-cycle, but
it does contain a 3-cycle when combined with some preference relation it implies, such as
%5.
3.3 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide a new test of the expected utility decision framework studied in
various information theoreticmodels. When there are n payoff relevant states, an (n + 1)-cycle
cannot be explained by the expected utility decision framework.
This result crucially relies on linearity of the utility function in beliefs, as the terminology
“expected utility” suggests. Without linearity the result would fail easily. Mymodel abstracts
away from specific information structures and the way the DM updates her belief, and thus
whether the DM is a Bayesian is not relevant.
It remains an open question whether the converse of the main result is also true. Under
n states, if a set of preference relations does not contain an (n + 1)-cycle (not even implicitly),
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Appendix A. Empty Core in Example 3
I provide the formal arguments for empty core in Example 3. In fact, we can show that
every allocation is blocked by at least one of these three allocations: µ12, µ23, and µ31, where
µi j stands for the allocation under which all type i and type j agents form a large coalition of
mass 2, and each agent of the third type stays alone.
To see this, suppose that there is an allocation µ that is not blocked by any of these three
blocks. An type i agent’s utility is at most 11, which is only achieved under allocation µi,i+1.
However, µi,i+1 is blocked by µi+1,i−1, and therefore all agents’ utility must be strictly less
than 11 under allocation µ. As a consequence, all type i agents are willing to participate in
the block µi,i+1.
For each i, because µi−1,i does not block µ while all type i − 1 agents are willing to
participate, it must be the case that there is some type i agents who are unwilling to participate
in µi−1,i. This can only happen when their utility is weakly greater than 10 under µ. This
implies that these type i agents are in some coalition xi with xii > 5/6. Suppose that the
coalition xi is not the same coalition as xi+1 or xi−1, then we have xii+1 < 1/6 and xii−1 < 1/6,
which contradicts xii ·
(




> 10. Therefore, the three coalitions x1, x2, and
x3 must be the same coalition x. However, xi > 5/6 for each i contradicts the maximum
capacity of a coalition. This concludes the proof that every allocation is blocked by at least
one of the three blocks µ12, µ23, and µ31.
55
Appendix B. Example 2 Continued








bik,s : k = 0, 1, 2, 3, s ∈ [0, 1]
}
where cij,l represents “playing one round of chess as a gender i player against a gender j
player, and being the l-th mover”, and bik represents “playing one round of bridge as a gender
i player, where k of my opponents are male”. The set of contract types is
X =
{
c0, c1, f , c1,m, c2
} ∪ {bk,s : k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, s ∈ [0, 1]}
where the contract type c2 (or c0) represents a round of chess with 2 male (or female) players,
the contract type c1, f (or c1,m) represents a round of chess with a male and a female player
where the female (or male) player is the first mover, and the contract type bk,s represents a
round of bridge with k male players and 4 − k female players and stake s. All contract types
in X are measures over R, which are specified as follows:
c0 = δ[c ff ,1] + δ[c ff ,2]
c1, f = δ[c fm,1] + δ[cmf ,2]
c1,m = δ[c fm,2] + δ[cmf ,1]
c2 = δ[cmm,1] + δ[cmm,2]
bk,s = k · δ[bmk−1,s] + (4 − k) · δ[b f3−k,s]
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for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and s ∈ [0, 1], where δ[r] is the degenerate measure that assigns measure
1 to r and measure 0 elsewhere.
A bundle β of roles is an integer-valued measure over R that assigns measure 1 to at
most 5 chess roles and 20 bridge roles, possibly duplicate. Then allocations and the core are
defined in a straightforward way.
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Appendix C. Technical Notes on Large Economies with Small Contracts
This appendix deals with some technical aspects of Section 2.2, and finally I will arrive
at the proof of proposition 2.2. Throughout this appendix, I’m going to repeatedly use the
following mathematical fact.
Lemma C.1 Let K be a compact metric space, and h be a positive real number. Then the set
of Borel measures µ over K with µ (K) ≤ h, endowed with the weak-* topology, is compact
and metrizable.
See Che, Kim, and Kojima (2015) for a proof of this result using Banach-Alaoglu
theorem. The next corollary is immediate, which states that compactness w.r.t. weak-*
topology is no more than sequential closedness and boundedness.
Corollary C.2 A setM of Borel measures over a compact metric space K is compact w.r.t.
the weak-* topology, iffM is sequentially closed and there exists h > 0 s.t. µ (K) ≤ h for all
µ ∈ M.
Proof. “If”:
Let M¯ be the set of all Borel measures µ over K with µ (K) ≤ h. By the previous
lemma, M¯ is compact and metrizable. Because µ (K) is continuous in µ,M is sequentially
closed in M¯. Then by metrizability,M is closed in M¯, and therefore compact.
“Only if”:
Because µ (K) is continuous in µ, and M is compact, the image {µ (K) : µ ∈ M} is
compact in R. Therefore, there exists h > 0 s.t. µ (K) ≤ h for all µ ∈ M. Then setM is a
subset of M¯, which is metrizable by the previous lemma. Then compactness ofM implies
closedness, which is equivalent to sequential closedness.
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δrn : rn ∈ R for each n, N′ ≤ N
}
where δr is the Dirac measure.
Proposition C.3 The set B of bundles is compact.
Proof. Let’s show that the set B is sequentially closed in the compact set
B¯ := {Borel measure β over R : ‖β‖ ≤ N}




in B convergent to β0 in
B¯. I want to show that β0 is also inB. Let βl =
∑nl
k=1 δr lk
. Because βl (R) = nl is convergent,




, take a subsequence









r lk → rk for each k. Then we have δr lk
w∗→ δrk and so βl
w∗→ β∗ := ∑nk=1 δrk in the subsequence.
Because the whole sequence converges to β0, we know that β0 = β∗, which is in B.
Let Bi be the set if nonempty IR bundles for type i agents, i.e.
Bi := {β ∈ B\ {0} : β %i 0}
where the zero measure 0 represents the empty bundle. We know that Bi ∪ {0} is closed by
continuity of%i. Also, since a sequence of nonempty bundle with β (R) ≥ 1 cannot converge
to the empty bundle, we know that Bi is closed in B¯, and therefore compact.
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C.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Now I prove the regularity of the matching game induced by the large-economy model
with small contracts.
1. Compactness of the allocation spaceM
Let
Mi := {Borel measure µi on Bi : µi (Bi) ≤ mi}
For an allocation µ ∈ M, we have µi ∈ Mi by the total mass constraint, and therefore we




Because Bi is a compact metrizable spaces, we know thatMi with the weak-* topology
is compact and metrizable. Then the product space M¯ endowed with the weak-* topology is
also compact and metrizable. Therefore, to showM to be compact, it is sufficient to show
thatM is sequentially closed in M¯. Arbitrarily take a sequence (µk ) inM convergent to
µ0 ∈ M¯, I want to show (1) the total mass constraint µ0i (Bi) ≤ mi for each i, and (2) there




















i (Bi) because the constant
function 1 is continuous on Bi. Because µki (Bi) ≤ mi due to µk ∈ M, we have µ0i (Bi) ≤
mi.










where xmin := minx∈X x (R) is well-defined and positive, because x (R) is continuous in x,
and X is a compact set that does not contain the zero measure. For each µx that corresponds






















xmindµx = xminµx (X)
Because X is a compact metrizable spaces, we know thatMx with the weak-* topology is




has a subsequence (µklx ) convergent to



























R f dβ is a continuous function in β, which is in turn because f is a continuous function











































R f dx is a continuous function in x, which is in turn because f is a continuous
61


















which is the accounting identity I want to show.
2. Closedness of sets of undominated allocations Ai
For each agent type i and allocation µˆ ∈ Mi, by definition the set
{µ ∈ M : µˆ Ai µ} =
{
µ ∈ M : µi (Bi) = mi and µi
({




BecauseM is metrizable, it is sufficient to show the set above to be sequentially closed in
M. Arbitrarily take a sequence (µk ) of allocations in the set above that is convergent to
a allocation µ0 ∈ M, I want to show that the limiting allocation µ0 is also in the set, i.e.
µ0i (Bi) = mi and µ0i
({
β ∈ Bi : βi (µˆ) i β
})
= 0. Because µk → µ0 implies µki → µ0i ,
we have µki (Bi) → µ0i (Bi). Because µki (Bi) = mi for each k, we have µ0i (Bi) = mi. On
the other hand, continuity of %i implies that
{
β ∈ Bi : βˆi i β
}
is an open set in Bi. By
Portmanteau theorem15 of weak convergence, we have
lim inf µki
({








β ∈ Bi : βˆ i β
})
= 0 for each k, we have µ0i
({
β ∈ Bi : βˆ i β
})
= 0. This
completes the proof of Proposition 2.2.
15See, for example, Ash (1972), Theorem 4.5.1.
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2.11
Let’s check the three requirements of a convex matching game.






f ∈F : µ f ∈ RΘ
}
with
addition and scalar multiplication defined component-wise. Clearly, the empty matching µ0







) ≤ 1, where w j > 0 and µ j ∈ M for all j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then
the linear combination µ :=
∑m
j=1 w





















ª®¬ = m (θ)
m∑
j=1
w jφθ (µ) ≤ m (θ)











f % f 0
by convexity of % f because
∑












On the other hand, for each worker type θ with µ f (θ) > 0, I need to show
(
f , µ f
)
%θ ∅.
Because µ f (θ) > 0, there exists ˆ s.t. µ ˆf (θ) > 0. Then by competition aversion, for every IR
match ( f , x)with x (θ) = 0 we have ( f , x) %θ ( f , µ ˆf ) %θ ∅. Therefore, we have
(




by convexity of %θ because
µ f =
∑














Therefore, the linear combination µ :=
∑m
j=1 w
j µ j is a feasible IR matching.
(3) For each firm f , define the relationD f overM f s.t. µ′ D f µ if µ′f % f µ f . For each
worker type θ, define the relation Dθ overMθ s.t. µ′ Dθ µ if there exists f with µ f (θ) > 0
s.t. ( f ′, µ′f ′) %θ
(
f , µ f
)
for all f ′ with µ′f ′ (θ) > 0. In other words, the relationDθ is obtained
by comparing the worst position for type θ workers under two matchings.
For an arbitrary i ∈ F ∪ Θ, let’s consider a φi-convex combination µ := ∑mj=1 w j µ j , i.e.
w j > 0 and µ j ∈ M for all j s.t. ∑mj=1 w jφi (µ j ) = 1 and∑mj=1 w jφ (µ j ) ≤ 1. Further assume
that µ j Di µˆ for each of its component µ j ∈ Mi. Clearly, µ is a feasible IR matching by (2),
and it is sufficient to show that µˆ bi µ.






f % f µˆ
by convexity of % f , because
∑













If i ∈ Θ, by definition we need to show ∑ f ∈F µ f (θ) = m (θ) and there exists fˆ with
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µˆ fˆ (θ) > 0 s.t.
(
f , µ f
)
%θ ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) for all f ∈ F with µ f (θ) > 0. First, we have
∑
f ∈F

















ª®¬ = m (θ)
m∑
j=1
w jφθ (µ) = m (θ)
Second, let ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) be the worst position for type θ students in matching µˆ, i.e.
( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) ∈ arg min%θ
{(
f , µˆ f
)
: µˆ f (θ) > 0
}
Then for each f with µ f (θ) > 0, there exists ˆ s.t. µ ˆf (θ) > 0. By competition aversion,
for every IR match ( f , x) with x (θ) = 0 we have ( f , x) %θ ( f , µ ˆf ) %θ ∅. Therefore we have(
f , µ f
)
%θ ( fˆ , µˆ fˆ ) by convexity of %θ , because
µ f =
∑















Appendix E. From Core to Stability
In this appendix, I demonstrate how we may show the existence of stable matchings by
showing nonempty core under somemodified preferences. Themodel I study in this appendix
is a two-sided many-to-one matching model with a continuum of firms and workers, which
is a special case of the first model in Azevedo and Hatfield (2015).
Consider a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers. Let F be the finite set of
firm types, and Θ be the finite set of worker types. Let m ( f ) > 0 be the mass of type f firms,
and m (θ) > 0 be the mass of type θ workers. Each coalition consists of one firm and finitely
many workers, and a coalition type is denoted as x, which is an nonnegative integer vector
over F ∪ Θ. We require that x ( f ) = 1 if a type x coalition involves a type f firm, and 0
otherwise. For each worker type θ, the integer x (θ) is the number of type θ workers involved
in a type x coalition. Assume that there are only finitely many types of coalitions that are
acceptable to all their members, and let X be the set of all such coalition types.
An allocation µ is a nonnegative mass vector over X , and µ (x) represents the mass of
type x contracts present under the allocation µ. Feasibility requires the total mass constraint∑
x∈X µ (x) · x ( f ) ≤ m ( f ) for each firm type f and
∑
x∈X µ (x) · x (θ) ≤ m (θ) for each worker
type θ. Let X f be the set of coalition types that involve a type f firm, and preferences % f
of type f firms are defined over X f , i.e. firms value the composition of their workers. Let
%θ be the preferences of type θ workers over firms, i.e. the workers only value the firm that
hires them. We extend %θ to coalition types according to the firm type they contain.
The following notion of core is standard.
Definition E.1 A coalition type xˆ c-blocks an allocation µ, if
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(1) For the firm type f involved in xˆ, either not all type- f firms are matched, or there
exists x that also involves f s.t. µ (x) > 0 and xˆ  f x, and
(2) For each worker type θ with xˆ (θ) > 0, either not all type-θ workers are matched, or
there exists x with µ (x) > 0 and x (θ) > 0 s.t. xˆ θ x.
An allocation is in the core if it is not c-blocked by any coalition type.
We can also define the following notion of stability.
Definition E.2 A coalition type xˆ s-blocks an allocation µ, if for the firm type f involved in
xˆ, either
(1) There exists x that also involves f s.t. µ (x) > 0 and xˆ  f x, and for each worker
type θ with xˆ (θ) > x (θ), there exist type-θ workers who are either unmatched or matched to
a strictly less preferred firm under µ, or
(2) There exists unmatched type- f firms, and for each worker type θ with xˆ (θ) > 0,
there exist type-θ workers who are either unmatched or matched to a strictly less preferred
firm under µ.
In the blocking notion of stability, a firm may bring some of its existing workers into
a blocking coalition, although these workers are indifferent. In the blocking notion of the
core, however, all participants of a blocking coalition are required to strictly benefit from
the block. To connect these two solution concepts, let’s consider a modification of workers’
preferences by using the relevant firm’s preferences to break ties. Formally, the modified
workers’ preference relation%′θ is the same as the original%θ when comparing two coalition
types that involve different types of firms, but follows % f when comparing two coalition
types that both involve f .
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Then the following observation is straightforward.
Proposition E.3 If allocation µ is in the core under the modified preferences %′, then µ is
stable under the original preferences %.
Proof. Suppose that there exists xˆ that s-blocks allocation µ under the original preferences
%. I want to show that xˆ also c-blocks µ under the modified preferences %′, which would
contradict the assumption in the proposition and conclude the proof.
First, we know that ′f= f , and so the firm wants to participate in the block. The
new workers in the s-block is willing to participate in the block by definition. The existing
workers strictly prefer the new coalition under the modified preferences, because they follow
the preferences of the firm. Therefore xˆ c-blocks allocation µ under %′. Contradiction.
By Theorem 2.4, the core under the modified preferences is nonempty. Therefore, stable
matchings exist under the original preferences, and this result, stated below, is a special case
of Azevedo and Hatfield (2015).
Theorem E.4 (Azevedo and Hatfield, 2015) In the two-sided many-to-one matching model
with a continuum of firms and workers, stable matchings exist.
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